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State v. Copes: Surveillance
Technology and the Limits of the
Good Faith Exception to Fourth
Amendment Violations
ELISE DESIDERIO*
INTRODUCTION
In recent decades, law enforcement officers’ ability to surveil
citizens has greatly expanded. Audio recording,1 thermal
imaging,2 and tracking devices3 allow law enforcement
nearly unfettered access to individuals’ information,
including real-time locations. These technologies can develop
at a faster rate than the law adapts to them. Thus, the Fourth
Amendment implications of some of these technologies is an
* Elise Desiderio is a Juris Doctor candidate at the University of
Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law, Class of 2019, and the
Editor-in-Chief of Volume 14 of the Journal of Business and Technology
Law. She thanks the Journal Executive Board and editorial staff for their
hard work and support, Professor Rena Steinzor for her invaluable and
unwavering mentorship and Professor Danielle Citron for sharing her
passion for and deep understanding of privacy law. Most importantly,
Elise thanks her family for their love and trust.
1 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 349 (1967) (evaluating police use of
a recording device placed on top of a phone booth).
2 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001) (holding that warrantless
use of a thermal imaging device to observe details of a person’s home
violated the Fourth Amendment).
3 State v. Copes, 165 A.3d 418, 447 (Md. 2017) (holding that use of a cell
site simulator to reveal and track the location of a cell phone is protected
by the good faith exception to the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary
rule).
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open question.4
Present issues implicate law enforcement’s use of cell
site location information (CSLI) and cell site simulators.
CSLI provides the historical data available from third-party
owned and maintained cell towers so law enforcement may
narrow their search area to phones pinging off of those
towers.5 Cell site simulators allow law enforcement to mimic
cell towers to capture and track the precise, real-time
location of a specific phone.6 The use of cell site simulators is
controversial, particularly in Baltimore City, Maryland,
where police have used such devices 4,300 times between
2007 and 2015.7
In July 2017, the Maryland Court of Appeals held in
State v. Copes8 that while police’s warrantless use of a
Hailstorm cell site simulator9 to locate a defendant’s cell
phone may have violated the Fourth Amendment, an
See Copes, 165 A.3d at 435 (“Appellate courts have reached different
conclusions as to whether the warrantless collection of historical CSLI
implicates the Fourth Amendment.”).
5 Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. —, slip op. at 11 (2018) (holding
that law enforcement must generally acquire a warrant to access CSLI
data).
6 Justin Fenton, Baltimore Police Used Secret Technology to Track
Cellphones in Thousands of Cases, THE BALTIMORE SUN (Apr. 9, 2015),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/baltimore-city/bs-md-cistingray-case-20150408-story.html.
7 Id.
8 Copes, 165 A.3d at 447 (holding that use of a cell site simulator to reveal
and track the location of a cell phone is protected by the good faith
exception to the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule).
9 “Although ‘Stingray’ has become a catch-all name for devices of [this]
kind, often referred to as ‘IMSI catchers,’” Harris Corporation—the
company that manufactures and sells most of these devices—sells other
“surveillance boxes, including the Hailstorm [at issue in Copes],
ArrowHead, AmberJack, and KingFish.” Sam Biddle, Long-Secret
Stingray Manuals Detail How Police Can Spy on Phones, THE INTERCEPT,
Sep. 12, 2016, https://theintercept.com/2016/09/12/long-secret-stingraymanuals-detail-how-police-can-spy-on-phones/.
4
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exception for reasonable law enforcement actions applies to
that violation.10 Generally, courts exclude information
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment from later
use as evidence against the accused in the prosecution’s casein-chief.11 However, the Supreme Court determined that an
exception to this exclusionary rule applies where law
enforcement acted reasonably, or in good faith, including
when police reasonably rely on a warrant that is later
determined to be invalid.12
The Court of Appeals’ reasoning in Copes is flawed for
three reasons. First, the court declined to make a definitive
finding that law enforcement violated Copes’ Fourth
Amendment rights.13 Second, the court expanded its
construction of the good faith exception when it found that
the law enforcement officers acted in good faith in using the
cell site simulator.14 Finally, the court declined to follow
soundly reasoned precedent set forth in State v. Andrews, a
Maryland Court of Special Appeals case largely in synthesis
Instead of defining “search” by its plain meaning (to seek out or to find),
the Supreme Court defines a “search” as a violation of a “subjective
manifestation of privacy” that “society is willing to accept as reasonable.”
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (J. Harlan, concurring).
This definition, decided upon after increasingly prevalent use of
surveillance technologies like voice recorders, has made the job of pinning
down what a search is under the Fourth Amendment more difficult. See
generally Id. at 347.
11 See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 139–140 (2009) (opining
that the exclusionary rule is a judicially created doctrine that allows
courts to exclude evidence obtained through some, but not all, Fourth
Amendment violations).
12 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918–919 (1984) (establishing the
good faith exception by holding that, where police officers acted
reasonably based on a mistakenly issued warrant, the exclusionary rule
should not apply because enforcement of the rule would have no deterrent
effect against future bad acts by law enforcement).
13 See infra Part II.A.; Copes, 165 A.3d at 431.
14 See infra Part II.B.; Copes, 165 A.3d at 444.
10

Journal of Business & Technology Law

173

State v. Copes

with Copes.15 In Andrews, the court held that warrantless use
of cell site simulators is generally impermissible.16 The
flawed reasoning in Copes resulted in a holding that applied
the good faith exception to the Fourth Amendment’s
exclusionary rule too broadly, allowing for unreasonable law
enforcement activity while also failing to vindicate accused
persons’ privacy rights.
I.

THE CASE

Robert Copes was charged with murder.17 At trial, Copes
filed a motion to suppress evidence police uncovered using a
cell site simulator to locate a phone that officers ultimately
learned belonged to him.18 The police department and the
company that sells the Hailstorm cell site simulator police
used to locate the phone had entered into a nondisclosure
agreement, barring the police department from disclosing its
use of the Hailstorm.19 The non-disclosure agreement also
covered officers’ pen register applications to magistrates.20
Copes, 165 A.3d at 439 (citing State v. Andrews, 134 A.3d 324 (Md. App.
2016)) (affirming a prior decision to suppress evidence gained using a cell
cite simulator; holding that warrantless use of cell site simulators is
generally impermissible).
16 See infra Part II.C.; State v. Andrews, 134 A.3d 324 (Md. App. 2016).
17 Copes, 165 A.3d at 429.
18 Id.
19 Id.; see also Fenton, supra note 6.
20 “In simple terms, a pen register records the numbers dialed out from a
given phone, and a trap and trace device records the numbers that dial
into that phone. . . [.] When information from both devices is aggregated,
a log of all incoming and outgoing calls can be created for the period that
the devices are active. These devices do not capture the content of
communications. The Fourth Amendment does not require law
enforcement officers to obtain a search warrant in order to use a pen
register or trap and trace device.” Copes, 165 A.3d at 424 (citing Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979)); see also Pen Register Statute, MD. CODE
ANN., CTS. & JUD. PRO. § 10–4B–01(c)(1) (“‘Pen register’ means a device
15
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The trial court granted Copes’ motion to suppress.21 The state
of Maryland appealed the circuit court’s decision, and the
Court of Special Appeals affirmed.22 The Court of Appeals
granted certiorari.23
The Court of Appeals reversed the Court of Special
Appeals’ decision on three bases. First, the Court of Appeals
noted that the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule is
applicable only when the deterrent effect of applying the rule
is substantial and outweighs any negative effect to the justice
system.24 Paramount among these negative effects is the
notion that “some guilty defendants may go free or receive
reduced sentences . . . offend[ing] basic concepts of the
criminal justice system.”25 The exclusionary rule is a
judicially created doctrine that allows courts to exclude
evidence obtained through some, but not all, Fourth
Amendment violations.26 The rule is “designed to safeguard
Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent
effect.”27 When evaluating deterrence, “[i]f . . . the
exclusionary rule does not result in appreciable deterrence,
then, clearly, its use . . . is unwarranted.”28
Second, the Court of Appeals maintained that “the
exclusionary rule is not applied when law enforcement
officials engage in ‘objectively reasonable law enforcement
activity,’ even if that activity is later found to be a violation
or process that records and decodes dialing, routing, addressing, or
signaling information transmitted by an instrument or facility from
which a wire or electronic communication is transmitted.”).
21 Copes, 165 A.3d at 430.
22 Id. at 430–431.
23 Id. at 431.
24 Id. at 432 (citing Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 147 (2009)).
25 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907–08 (1984).
26 Herring, 555 U.S. at 139–40.
27 Id. (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)).
28 United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976).
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of the Fourth Amendment.”29 Under the facts in Copes, the
good faith exception’s application is based on “objectively
reasonable reliance” on a warrant that is found to lack
probable cause.30 The Copes court found that, although the
use of the Hailstorm was likely a Fourth Amendment search
conducted without a warrant,31 the officers’ behavior in using
a cell site simulator under a pen register order was
objectively reasonable.32 Accordingly, the Court of Appeals
reversed the Court of Special Appeals’ decision granting
Copes’ motion to suppress.33
Finally, the Copes court found that the pen register
order the police acquired was functionally the same as a
warrant for Fourth Amendment purposes.34 The Fourth
Amendment’s bar against unreasonable searches is
“generally satisfied when law enforcement officers obtain a
warrant authorizing the search in question.”35 The Copes
court found that a pen register order was functionally the
same as a warrant in part because similar orders, under
which police officers used cell site simulators in a similar
way, were approved at least semi-regularly.36 Because the
officers relied on a mechanism police regularly used before,
the Court of Appeals found that using a pen register for cell
site simulators represents objectively reasonable police
activity such that the good faith exception should apply.37
Copes, 165 A.3d at 432 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 919) (establishing a
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule)).
30 Herring, 555 U.S. at 142 (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 922).
31 Copes, 165 A.3d at 431.
32 Id. at 447.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 444.
35 Id. at 440 (citing Riley v. California, — U.S. —, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482
(2014)).
36 Copes, 165 A.3d at 444.
37 Id.
29
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In her dissent, Judge Hotten, joined by Judges Greene
and Adkins, argued two points: (1) the pen register order was
not a search warrant or its functional equivalent;38 and (2)
the good faith exception cannot apply under United States v.
Leon.39 First, the dissent noted that a “Hailstorm device
collects far more information than what is authorized by the
statutory scope of the Maryland Pen Register statute.”40 The
Hailstorm device scans not only for the target cell phone, but
also the whole two-block radius surrounding the device.41
This capability, the dissent posited, is like the thermal
imaging technology used in Kyllo, for which the Supreme
Court held law enforcement needed to first acquire a warrant
before using.42
Second, the dissent found it “unreasonable for the
police officers to presume that the Pen Register/Trap [and]
Trace and Cellular Tracking Device order was sufficient to
authorize their use of the Hailstorm device.”43 The dissent
found that the pen register order “was neither represented as
a warrant when presented to the issuing judge nor did it
comport with the dictates of the Fourth Amendment
requiring that a warrant particularly describe the place to be
Id. at 447.
Id.; United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1983) (outlining four
situations in which the good faith exception is inapplicable: where (1) “the
magistrate . . . in issuing a warrant was misled by information in the
affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false,
except for his reckless disregard for the truth[;]” (2) the “magistrate
wholly abandoned his judicial role[;]” (3) the affidavit is “so lacking in
indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence
entirely unreasonable[;]” or (4) the warrant is “so facially deficient[, . . .]
failing to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized[,
. . .] that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.”)
(internal quotations and citations omitted).
40 Copes, 165 A.3d at 449.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 452.
38
39
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[searched or the technology to be used in conducting the
search.”44 The dissent’s reasoning and conclusions are sound;
the following analysis expands upon that reasoning to
further address the flaws in the Copes majority’s holding.
II.

ANALYSIS

While the Copes majority found that police use of a Hailstorm
cell site simulator was likely a warrantless search under the
Fourth Amendment,45 the court declined to make a definitive
finding that the officers infringed upon Copes’ guaranteed
freedom from unreasonable searches, muddying the waters
for future defendants. Additionally, the Court of Appeals’
decision improperly expanded the good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule. In finding that (1) a pen register order is
likely functionally the same as a warrant,46 and (2) disclosure
of technological details is not necessary to obtain a valid pen
register,47 the Copes court applied the good faith exception
too broadly, such that the exception threatens to eclipse the
rule. Finally, the Copes court failed to vindicate accused
persons’ Fourth Amendment rights when it declined to follow
State v. Andrews,48 a case in synthesis with Copes, where the
Court of Special Appeals held that the good faith exception is
generally inapplicable to warrantless use of cell site
simulators.49
Id.
Copes, 165 A.3d at 431.
46 Id. at 444.
47 Id. at 446.
48 State v. Andrews, 134 A.3d 324 (Md. App. 2016) (affirming a prior
decision to suppress evidence gained using a cell cite simulator without a
search warrant). Andrews is a Court of Special Appeals case and is thus
not binding on the Court of Appeals. However, the Court of Special
Appeals’ holding in Andrews is well-reasoned and thus represents sound
persuasive authority.
49 Copes, 165 A.3d at 447.
44
45

Journal of Business & Technology Law

178

DESIDERIO

A. Use of a cell site simulator to locate and track
Copes’ phone constitutes a definitive Fourth
Amendment violation
The Copes court found that police likely engaged in a
warrantless search when they used a Hailstorm device to
locate his phone and, by extension, Copes himself.50 However,
the court ultimately declined to decide the Fourth
Amendment question because the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari to hear United States v. Carpenter,
a case involving warrantless use of CSLI, not cell site
simulators.51 Articulating its reasoning and referencing
Carpenter, the Court of Appeals opined: “The Supreme Court
has reached varying conclusions about the application of [the
Id. at 431.
Id. at 447; Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. — (2018). Justice
Roberts, writing for the majority, recognized the scope of information
available to law enforcement from third-party service providers, and
indeed “the progress of science[,] has afforded law enforcement a powerful
new tool to carry out its important responsibilities. At the same time, this
tool risks Government encroachment of the sort the Framers [of the
United States Constitution], after consulting the lessons of history,
drafted the Fourth Amendment to prevent.” Carpenter, 585 U.S. —, slip
op. at 22.
50
51
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principles laid out in Katz52 and Kyllo53] to the use of location
tracking devices, and has recently agreed to consider such an
issue related to cell phones.”54
The Court of Appeals’ reasoning in its decision to defer
addressing the Fourth Amendment question is flawed for two
reasons. First, the technology at issue in Carpenter does not
yield results as precise as that used in Copes, rendering the
Fourth Amendment implications of those technologies not
comparable.55 Second, even considering Supreme Court
precedent pre-Carpenter, the Court of Appeals should have
found that warrantless use of cell site simulators definitively
violated the Fourth Amendment, irrespective of the Supreme
Court’s then-pending decision in Carpenter.56 The Copes
holding may create instability for future defendants about
the suppression of evidence. Such instability then results in
a strategic disadvantage to defendants as they move through
the criminal justice system.
In Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 351 (1967). The Katz Court held that Federal Bureau of
Investigation officials violated a defendant’s Fourth Amendment right
against unreasonable search when they placed a listening device on top
of a public telephone booth to record a defendant’s end of a phone
conversation. Id. at 354. Though a phone booth is not a constitutionally
protected place, because the defendant entered the booth and closed the
door before speaking on the phone, the Court found that recording the
defendant’s end of the conversation from atop the booth was a violation
of his Fourth Amendment protections. Id. Society is willing to accept that
when a person enters a phone booth and closes the door, that person
reasonably expects further conversation inside the booth to be private. Id.
at 359.
53 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33 (holding that warrantless use of surveillance
technology violates the Fourth Amendment if law enforcement (1) uses
technology not in public use (2) to observe details of a private home (3) in
a way that would be otherwise impossible without physical intrusion).
54 Copes, 165 A.3d at 433–434.
55 See infra Part II.A.i.
56 See infra Part II.A.ii.
52
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1. The Court of Appeals’ decision conflated CSLI
and cell site simulators
At issue in Carpenter was law enforcement’s warrantless
acquisition of cell site location information (CSLI).57 The
Copes court noted that other courts held that accessing CSLI
data was not a Fourth Amendment search.58 The court also
noted that many courts considering CSLI cases cited the
“third party doctrine,”59 which the Supreme Court
established when it concluded that “law enforcement officers
do not conduct a search for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment when they request a telephone company to
install a pen register60 or obtain a depositor’s bank records61
from a financial institution.”62 Finding general points of
synthesis between CSLI usage and reliance on pen registers,
the Copes court declined to decide whether a Fourth
Amendment violation occurred when officers used a cell site
simulator while executing a pen register order.63
Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. –––, slip op. at 11 (2018) (holding
that warrantless acquisition of CSLI does not fall under the good faith
exception to the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule).
58 Copes, 165 A.3d at 435.
59 Id. at 436; United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 427–28 (2016) (en
banc) (holding that a person does not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy regarding her cell phone's CSLI because a cell phone user
voluntarily shares that information with her service provider whenever
she uses the phone to call or text), abrogated by Carpenter v. United
States, 585 U.S. — (2018).
60 See generally Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (holding that use
of a pen register is not a search under the Fourth Amendment because
individuals share the numbers they dial with their service providers).
61 See generally United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (holding that
obtaining a depositor’s bank records is not a search because the depositor
shares those records with the bank).
62 Copes, 165 A.3d at 435.
63 Id. at 439.
57

Journal of Business & Technology Law

181

State v. Copes

However, in Carpenter, the Court held that “a warrant
is required in the rare case where the suspect has a
legitimate privacy interest in records held by a third party,”64
and further found that suspects have legitimate privacy
interests in their CSLI records because those records are part
of an individual’s “papers” or “effects.”65
Even if the third-party doctrine covered CSLI data,
CSLI and cell site simulators are not the same or comparable
mechanisms, nor do they provide the same or comparable
information.66 Cell site simulators allow for more precise
location targeting than CSLI and allow law enforcement to
acquire data on their own, without relying on a third party.67
CSLI provides data available from a third-party cell tower so
law enforcement may narrow their search area.68 Conversely,
a cell site simulator allows law enforcement to simulate a cell
tower and capture and track the precise location of a specific
phone.69 Because of their nature, capabilities, and
invasiveness, cell site simulators are not equivalent to CSLI,
and thus neither are their Fourth Amendment implications.
Carpenter, 585 U.S. –––, slip op. at 21.
Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
66 When the Sixth Circuit decided Carpenter, the court noted “the
distinction between GPS tracking and CSLI acquisition,” writing that
“CSLI does appear to provide significantly less precise information about
a person’s whereabouts than GPS and, consequently, [the court agrees]
that a person’s privacy interest in the CSLI his or her cell phone
generates may indeed be lesser.” United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d
880, 894 (6th Cir. 2016), rev’d by Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. —
(2018) (citing United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012)
(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“GPS monitoring generates a precise,
comprehensive record of a person’s public movements that reflects a
wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and
sexual associations.”)).
67 See infra note 84.
68 Carpenter, 585 U.S. —, slip op. at 2 (2018).
69 See Fenton, supra note 6.
64
65
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2. Supreme Court precedent supports a definitive
finding that warrantless use of cell site
simulators
violates
individuals’
Fourth
Amendment protection against unreasonable
searches
Supreme Court precedent, set in Kyllo v. United States,
supports a holding that the warrantless use of surveillance
technology violates the Fourth Amendment when law
enforcement (1) uses technology not in public use; (2) to
observe details of a private home; (3) in a way that would be
otherwise impossible without physical intrusion.70 Use of the
cell site simulator, at issue in Copes, satisfies all three factors
required under Kyllo.71
First, the officers relied on a surveillance method not
in public use.72 Cell site simulators sold by Harris
Corporation are only available to police departments and
federal agencies; systems may cost $27,800, excluding
software and accessories.73 Second, the officers observed
details of a private home, namely Copes’ real-time location
within his apartment.74 Finally, the officers observed those
details in a manner that would have been otherwise
impossible without physical intrusion.75 The officers could
not have located the defendant within the building without
physical intrusion of that building.76 Instead of physically
intruding, the officers located the building by intercepting a
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33.
Id.
72 Id.
73 Curtis Waltman, Here’s How Much a StingRay Cell Phone Surveillance
Tool Costs, VICE: MOTHERBOARD (Dec. 8, 2016), https://motherboard.vice.
com/en_us/article/gv5k3x/heres-how-much-a-stingray-cell-phonesurveillance-tool-costs.
74 Copes, 165 A.3d at 421.
75 Id.
76 Id.
70
71
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cell phone signal to find the phone’s precise location inside
the building.77 Thus, warrantless use of a cell site simulator
to precisely locate Copes’ phone—and, by extension, Copes
himself—violated Copes’ Fourth Amendment protections
under Kyllo.78
B. The Court of Appeals erroneously applied the
good faith exception
The Copes court found that it was not clear to the detectives
that the use of a pen register to employ a cell site simulator
failed to satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s warrant
requirement.79 In so finding, the Court of Appeals relied on
testimony from “Detective Kershaw, [who stated that]
applications for similar orders had been approved ‘many,
many times,’ and never denied.”80 Because of law
enforcement’s prior reliance on these pen register orders, the
Copes court found that law enforcement acted reasonably.81
The court found that the officers’ actions were reasonable
independent of whether (1) pen register orders were a valid
basis on which to surveil using a Hailstorm device; and (2)
the magistrate approving the order was aware that police
planned to use a Hailstorm device.82
The Supreme Court in United States v. Leon described
four situations in which the good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule does not apply.83 These situations are as
follows:
Id.
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33.
79 Copes, 165 A.3d at 444.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 447.
82 Id. at 444, 446.
83 Leon, 468 U.S. at 923.
77
78
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(1) the magistrate is misled by information in
the application for the warrant that the officer
knew was false or would have known was
false, except for a reckless disregard for the
truth; (2) the magistrate wholly abandons a
detached and neutral role; (3) the affidavit is
so lacking in probable cause so [as] to render
official belief in its existence entirely
unreasonable; (4) the warrant is so facially
deficient, by failing to particularize the place
to be searched or the things to be seized, that
the executing officers cannot reasonably
presume it to be valid.84

First, a pen register order is not comparable to a warrant in
form or function.85 The good faith exception, as applied to the
facts in Copes, requires officers’ reasonable reliance on an
invalid warrant or what the officers reasonably believed to be
its functional equivalent;86 therefore, the good faith exception
should not apply to officers’ reliance on a pen register order
in Copes. Second, even if the pen register order were
considered functionally equivalent to a warrant, the facts in
Copes speak to the first situation under Leon, rendering the
good faith exception inapplicable for misleading an issuing
magistrate, by omitting the planned use of a cell site
simulator.87

Copes, 165 A.3d at 433 (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 923).
See infra Part II.B.i.
86 Id.
87 See infra Part II.B.ii.
84
85
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1. The good faith exception requires reasonable
reliance on a warrant that is later found invalid;
pen register orders are not functionally
equivalent to warrants
A pen register order is not a warrant,88 nor is a pen register
order functionally the same as a warrant.89 A pen register
“records the numbers dialed out from a given phone,” while
related technology known as a “trap and trace device records
the numbers that dial into that phone.”90 Importantly, a pen
register order is easier for law enforcement to acquire than a
search warrant. An application for a pen register order
requires:
Use of a pen register alone is not a “search” under the Fourth
Amendment, as the Supreme Court noted in Smith v. Maryland. Smith
v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–746 (1979). However, contemporary
technology allows for the gathering of far more information, in real-time,
than the phone numbers dialed out that officers acquired in Smith. Id.;
Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. —, slip op. at 11 (declining to extend
Smith to include CLSI). Moreover, precedent suggests that pen register
orders have limits. The Supreme Court in Riley v. California “reject[ed]
the . . . suggesting that officers should always be able to search a phone’s
call log.” Riley, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2492 (2014) (holding that officers could
not go through the call logs of a suspect’s cell phone without a warrant).
A pen register may have, in its earlier uses, been a way to access call logs,
as in Smith, but in Copes, officers used the same type of order to not only
record phone numbers dialed in and out from a cell phone, but the realtime, “fairly accurate estimate of the target phone’s location.” Copes, 165
A.3d at 423. See also Copes, 165 A.3d at 423 n.12 (“It also may be possible
to configure particular cell site simulators to intercept data or
communications. See generally S. K. Pell & C. Soghoian, A Lot More Than
a Pen Register, and a Lot Less Than a Wiretap: What the StingRay
Teaches Us About How Congress Should Approach the Reform of Law
Enforcement Surveillance Authorities, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 134, 146
(2013). According to testimony at the hearing in this case, the cell site
simulator used in this case did not have that capability.”).
89 Copes, 165 A.3d at 440.
90 Id. at 424.
88
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(1) The identity of the State law enforcement
or investigative officer making the application
and the identity of the law enforcement agency
conducting the investigation; and
(2) [A] statement under oath by the applicant
that the information likely to be obtained is
relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation
being conducted by that agency.91

A search warrant application, in contrast, requires law
enforcement to provide a sworn affidavit stating that “there
is probable cause to believe” either a crime is being
committed within the issuing judge’s jurisdiction or “property
subject to seizure under the criminal laws of the State is on
the person or in or on the building apartment, premises,
place, or thing.”92 Because a pen register application is less
stringent than a search warrant petition, officers need not be
as certain about the nature or specificity of the information
they anticipate uncovering through surveillance executed
under a pen register.93
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals recently
considered the question of whether the good faith exception
applies when officers use a cell site simulator without a
warrant, and held that the good faith exception is
inapplicable in such cases.94 Jones v. United States, decided
September 21, 2017, is a crucial holding from an influential
court rejecting application of a good faith exception in
warrantless cell site simulator cases.95 The Jones court
rejected assertions that the Copes court accepted, namely
that (1) “at the time of [the] incident, no court had held that
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PRO. § 10-4B-03.
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PRO. § 1-203(a)(1).
93 Id.
94 See Jones v. United States, 168 A.3d 703, 707 (D.C. Ct. App. 2017).
95 Id.
91
92
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using a simulator to locate a phone violated the Fourth
Amendment,” and (2) applying the exclusionary rule “would
not meaningfully deter police misconduct.”96
While the Jones court recognized that the Supreme
Court upheld the good faith exception when officers
reasonably believed a warrant was valid, the Jones court
found that the police, “not acting pursuant to a seemingly
valid warrant, statute, or court opinion, conducted an
unlawful search using a secret technology that they had
shielded from judicial oversight and public scrutiny.”97
Though Jones was decided several months after Copes, the
Jones holding highlighted the deficiencies in the Court of
Appeals’ decision to consider a pen register as the functional
equivalent of a warrant.
2. Misleading the issuing magistrate through
omission of information disclosed in a pen
register order precludes applicability of the good
faith exception
Even if a pen register order were functionally the same as a
warrant, the good faith exception remains inapplicable
because the officers in Copes failed to disclose their planned
use of a Hailstorm device when applying for that order.98 The
Jones court made a similar determination, finding that
“assuming the police believed the warrantless use of the [cell
site] simulator to be lawful, they could not have reasonably
relied on that belief, given the secrecy surrounding the
device.”99 The circumstances at play in Copes and Jones,
where law enforcement officers were precluded from
disclosing cell site simulator use in applications to the
Id. at 719 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 720.
98 Copes, 165 A.3d at 429.
99 Jones, 168 A.3d at 720.
96
97
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court,100 mirror the first circumstance in which the good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule is inapplicable under Leon:
where “the magistrate is misled by information in the
application for the warrant that the officer knew was false or
would have known was false, except for a reckless disregard
for the truth.”101 In Copes, as in Jones, law enforcement
“shielded” “secret technology” from both “judicial oversight
and public opinion.”102
The Copes court acknowledged that the officers “failed
to go into greater detail about [the] technology” the officers
planned to use, but ultimately found that “search warrants
need not ‘include a specification of the precise manner in
which they are to be executed.’”103 The Court of Appeals
relied on the Supreme Court’s holding in Dalia v. United
States that law enforcement officers need not enumerate in
precise detail the officers’ intended surveillance method, even
in a warrant application.104 The Copes court reasoned that
Dalia allowed for a certain level of nondisclosure: “the
absence of greater detail does not render the order that was
issued so fatally deficient that the detectives could not
execute it in good faith.”105 The Copes court held that “the
application and order clearly inform a reasonably diligent
reader of what the officers seek to do and how they plan to do
it (even if they do not describe the technical details).”106
Copes, 165 A.3d at 446; Jones, 168 A.3d at 719.
Leon, 468 U.S. at 923.
102 Jones, 168 A.3d at 720.
103 Copes, 165 A.3d at 446 (quoting Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238,
257 (1979) (holding that under the Fourth Amendment, search warrants
need not “include a specification of the precise manner in which they are
to be executed”).
104 Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 257 (1979).
105 Copes, 165 A.3d at 446–447.
106 Id. at 446 (emphasis added).
100
101
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However, these “technical details”107 are the thrust of
the issue in Copes, and failing to disclose those details
amounts to “[misleading the magistrate] by information in
the application for the warrant that the officer knew was
false or would have known was false” under Leon.108 If the
technical details in question may affect the issuing judge’s
analysis of the reasonableness of the order under the Fourth
Amendment,109 then absence of those details may mislead
the issuing magistrate and render the order “fatally
deficient.”110
When applying for a warrant, the Fourth Amendment
requires law enforcement to state the “place to be
searched.”111 In Copes, that “place” was the location of Copes’
cell phone. Even the less stringent pen register order
application requires a “statement under oath by the
applicant that the information likely to be obtained is
relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation being
conducted by that agency.”112 Again, in Copes, the
Id.
Id. at 433 (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 923).
109 “For an issuing judge to appreciate the gravity of the exercise of the
requirements and parameters of the Fourth Amendment and any
intrusion on a person's privacy rights, the issuing judge must appreciate
the scope and manner of the search proposed to be conducted. The more
an issuing judge understands the technology associated with the device
sought to be used, the better the issuing judge can appreciate the
constitutional impact of the search request, particularly when the device
has the capacity to conduct a very broad, intrusive search impacting the
Fourth Amendment. As the Court of Special Appeals eloquently stated,
‘[t]he analytical framework requires analysis of the functionality of the
surveillance device and the range of information potentially revealed by
its use.’” Copes, 165 A.3d at 447 (JJ. Hotten, Greene, and Adkins,
dissenting) (quoting Andrews, 134 A.3d at 338).
110 Leon, 468 U.S. at 923. But see Copes, 165 A.3d at 447 (“the absence of
greater detail does not render the order that was issued so fatally
deficient that the detectives could not execute it in good faith.”).
111 U.S. CONST., amend. IV.
112 MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PRO. § 10-4B-03(b)(2).
107
108
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“information likely to be obtained” is the location of the cell
phone.113
Significantly, however, depending on the technology
used—CSLI or cell site simulator—“location” has two
discrete meanings: approximate location and precise location.
A traditional pen register (and related technology, the trap
and trace), uses information gathered from a third-party
service provider to generate a list of various signals
transmitted to and from a specific phone.114 Using a pen
register order to access CSLI, at issue in Carpenter, is a way
to determine a cell phone’s approximate location by
triangulating the radial range of the existing cell phone
towers from which the phone derives its communicative
capability.115
Conversely, a cell site simulator, at issue in Copes, is
a device with which law enforcement officers may simulate a
cell phone tower themselves.116 Therefore, law enforcement
does not use information from existing cell towers to capture
a specific phone number to immediately identify the precise
location of the phone associated with that number.117 Using
a cell site simulator achieves a more specific result than
relying on a traditional pen register or CSLI. As such, the
location results—the “place to be searched” under the Fourth
Amendment—when using a cell site simulator rather than
CSLI are qualitatively different.118 Thus, failing to disclose
planned use of a cell site simulator when applying for a pen
register order may have substantial effects on the issuing
judge’s reasonableness analysis.119 In failing to disclose, law
Id.
18 U.S.C. §§ 3127(3), 3127(4) (2012).
115 Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. —, slip op. at 2 (2018).
116 See Fenton, supra note 6.
117 Id.
118 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
119 Leon, 468 U.S. at 923.
113
114
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enforcement puts a thumb on the scale in its favor in a way
that should render a resulting pen register order invalid
under Leon.120
The officers in Copes did not mention their planned use
of a cell-site simulator in their application for a pen register
order because a nondisclosure agreement between
Hailstorm’s manufacturer and the Baltimore Police
Department bound those officers to silence on the subject,
even to judges.121 This failure to disclose the use of a cell-site
simulator is evidence of “reckless disregard for the truth”
about the technology’s uses and capabilities.122 The
“technical details”123 of a Hailstorm device are qualitatively
different and more advanced than other means by which law
enforcement may “initiate a signal to determine the location
of the subject’s mobile phone.”124 For example, a Hailstorm
device can remotely make a targeted phone ring.125 These
crucial distinctions (1) affect the efficacy and quality of the
information gathered; and (2) may affect an issuing judge’s
analysis. Thus, allowing for a good faith exception to the
Fourth Amendment violation in Copes was inappropriate.

Id.
Copes, 165 A.3d at 452. See also Fenton, supra note 6; Ernest Reith,
Letter to Police Commissioner Bealefeld and State’s Attorney Bernstein,
Purchase Wireless Collection Equipment/Technology and Non-Disclosure
Obligation, Federal Bureau of Investigation (July 13, 2011),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/bal-police-stingray-non-disclosureagreement-20150408-htmlstory.html.
122 Leon, 468 U.S. at 923.
123 Copes, 165 A.3d at 446.
124 Id.
125 See Fenton, supra note 6.
120
121
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C. The Court of Appeals should have employed the
rational precedent set forth in Andrews
Despite its finding that Copes’ Fourth Amendment rights
were likely violated, the Court of Appeals declined to apply
State v. Andrews.126 Andrews is a Maryland Court of Special
Appeals case that involved the precise type of surveillance
technology that law enforcement utilized in Copes.127 The
facts in Copes and Andrews related to law enforcement’s
behavior are largely in synthesis.128 The law enforcement
officers in Andrews were subject to a nondisclosure
agreement between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and
the State’s Attorney’s Office.129 Police officers in Copes were
also bound not to disclose use of the Hailstorm device in pen
register applications.130 The Copes court noted that “[w]ith
respect to the nondisclosure agreement . . . the testimony at
the hearing in this case was that the detectives would have
answered any questions of the issuing judge about what they
State v. Andrews, 134 A.3d 324, 327 (Md. App. 2016) (affirming a prior
decision to suppress evidence gained using a cell cite simulator).
127
Id.
128 Copes, 165 A.3d at 438 (“In Andrews, the defendant had been charged
with first-degree murder related to a shooting during an illicit drug
transaction. A warrant was issued for his arrest, but police were initially
unable to locate him. Officers learned the number of the defendant's cell
phone through a confidential informant. The officers applied for—and
obtained—a court order based in part on the Pen Register Statute, similar
to the order in this case. Using a cell site simulator, officers were able to
locate the cell phone—and the defendant—at a home in Baltimore. They
arrested the defendant and then obtained a search warrant for the home
where they found a gun in the cushions of the couch where the defendant
had been sitting. The circuit court granted the defendant's motion to
suppress the gun and other evidence as fruits of an illegal search—i.e.,
the use of the cell site simulator without a search warrant.”) (citing
Andrews, 134 A.3d at 327-29).
129 Id. at 446.
130 See Fenton, supra note 6.
126
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planned to do.”131 Because officers would have answered
questions about the Hailstorm device were they asked about
that device, the Copes court found no bad faith.132
The Copes court correctly pointed out that Andrews
cites United States v. Graham, a case that the Fourth Circuit
overruled en banc.133 Upon re-hearing, the full Fourth Circuit
panel in Graham held that acquisition of CSLI without a
warrant is covered by the good faith exception.134 However,
the type and specificity of the location information gathered
sufficiently distinguish CSLI and cell site simulators.135 As
CSLI and cell site simulators are distinguishable, so too are
the situations in Graham, Andrews, and later Copes.
Moreover, Graham has been abrogated by the Supreme
Court’s decision in Carpenter, holding that law enforcement
must obtain a warrant before acquiring CSLI data.136
Finally, the Copes court’s assertion that “the
detectives would have answered any questions of the issuing
judge about what they planned to do”137 unreasonably
stretches the Leon Court’s rule against misleading a
magistrate.138 The Copes court found that so long as officers
are willing to answer an issuing judge’s questions, those
officers did not mislead that judge by omitting details.139
However, the officers in Copes withheld highly pertinent
Copes, 165 A.3d at 446.
Id.
133 Id. at 439; see also United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332 (4th Cir.
2015), reh’g en banc granted by United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421
(4th Cir. 2016), abrogated by Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. —
(2018).
134 United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2015), reh’g en banc
granted by United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2016),
abrogated by Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. — (2018).
135 See supra Part II.B.ii.
136 Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. —, slip op. at 21 (2018).
137 Copes, 165 A.3d at 446.
138 Leon, 468 U.S. at 923.
139 Copes, 165 A.3d at 446.
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information from the issuing judge when applying for a pen
register order, specifically, the crucial information regarding
how the officers planned to execute their surveillance.140
Finding that law enforcement’s later willingness to answer
questions negated any bad faith expressed by withholding
information from the magistrate unreasonably stretches the
factors in Leon,141 transferring law enforcement’s burden to
issuing judges. Such a finding effectively requires judges to
proactively ask officers questions about the very technology
those officers omit from their pen register orders. Judges,
then, may not be aware of what questions to ask, precisely
because officers withhold their use of Hailstorm devices.
CONCLUSION
Conflation of the nature and function of related but distinct
emerging technologies, particularly when used by law
enforcement, is a misapplication of facts to relevant law that
can result in injustice, as in Copes. The good faith exception
to the exclusionary rule should be construed narrowly,
particularly when the use and disclosure of details of
surveillance technology are involved. A narrow construction
of the good faith exception allows for more effective
preservation of privacy rights in the twenty-first century.
140
141

Id.
Leon, 468 U.S. at 923.

Journal of Business & Technology Law

195

